By
May 1973, diplomatic efforts were underway within Asean to broker a
deal whereby Ferdinand Marcos would drop the Philippine claim to Sabah
in return for Malaysia stopping the flow of arms to the Moro National
Liberation Front (MNLF), thought to be facilitated by Sabah Chief
Minister Tun Mustapha.
However, little seems to have been achieved
at the meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Razak and Indonesia’s
President Suharto in Palembang, South Sumatra on May 7. Razak even
denied that they had discussed the possibility of a three-nation summit,
saying that, although he would welcome it, he had received no offer of
mediation by Indonesia. Those hoping for a solution to the problem
probably took no comfort from the fact that Razak returned home in the
private jet of Tun Mustapha, who welcomed him on his arrival.
It
transpired, in fact, that the cause of Indonesian mediation had received
a setback when, on May 1, Suharto aide Ali Murtopo had, without
presidential approval, made what the US Embassy in Jakarta judged to be
an “ill-advised statement” in which he had publicly urged the
Philippines to drop its claim to Sabah, arguing that unless this was
done, Indonesia might be subject to similar claims in the future. This,
said the Embassy had “stunned and perplexed” Indonesia’s Foreign
Department. A week later, Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik denied
to the press that Indonesia had asked the Philippines to drop its claim,
dismissing the possibility of any future claim affecting Indonesia.
Despite
his public denial two days earlier, on May 9 Malaysian Prime Minister
Razak told the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur that Indonesia was, in fact,
“committed” to act as intermediary and that Foreign Minister Malik was
planning a meeting, hopefully in the near future. There was, indeed, a
meeting of sorts between Philippine and Malaysian representatives in
Jakarta at this time, although it was obviously not a summit. At this
stage, Malik was confident that Marcos would drop the Sabah claim,
although he advised that, due to Murtopo’s unwise statement, there would
be no decision for “some weeks.”
On May 11, secretary general Zaiton
of Malaysia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that there would be
a meeting in a “week or two.” He predicted — correctly — that the
Philippines would not be pleased by the fact that Malaysia would be
represented by Minister of Special Functions Ghazali Shafie, as in the
past he had been the “principal contestor” of the Philippines’ claim to
Sabah.
The tripartite meeting eventually took place in Hong Kong on
June 1. The UK High Commission advised the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur
that the Malaysians were not optimistic because the Philippine
delegation was composed of “Marcos politicians.” This pessimism was
shared by the Indonesians, Malik’s chief of personal staff Alex Alatas
telling US Ambassador Francis Galbraith that the Philippine position
“seemed to have hardened,” and so he expected no breakthrough. He was
right, although the Malaysians agreed to join with Indonesia in
assisting the Philippines to resolve the problems in the south of that
country, and a further meeting, at which an Indonesia formula would be
agreed, was planned.
Thereafter, Malaysia changed its line and by
July the Indonesians conceded that they were no longer “pushing hard”
for a resumption of talks. Neither was Malaysia, for according to
Razak’s foreign affairs adviser Zain Azraai the government no longer
agreed that the issues of Sabah and the MNLF rebellion should be linked,
as the Philippine claim on Sabah was “completely unjustified” and the
latter was only soluble by unilateral Philippine action. Linking them,
he said, would allow Marcos to use Malaysia as a “whipping boy” if the
situation worsened. In any case, Malaysian distrust of Marcos (who, it
was feared, could always revive the Sabah claim at a later date) was a
“fundamental factor.”
According to the US’ Kuala Lumpur Embassy, Zain
stated that “clear evidence of Marcos’s desire and ability to meet
demands of Philippine Muslims” was more important to Malaysia than
settlement of the Sabah claim. Embassy official Cheslaw commented that
Zain’s remarks were “somewhat typical” of Malaysia’s attitude, and that
“deeply pervasive distrust of Marcos … appears to be their principal
inhibition in moving toward a solution.”
In Jakarta on Aug. 2, US
Ambassador Galbraith asked Malik how his mediation efforts were going.
Malik expressed “some impatience and irritation” with the Malaysians,
who had departed from their Hong Kong undertaking by saying that they
wanted no involvement in the Southern Philippines problem but that the
Sabah claim should be dropped anyway, and that they feared that Muslims
in Malaysia and elsewhere would blame them if they assisted Marcos. The
Malaysians had asked Malik whether he trusted Marcos, and he had replied
that he did, and that he would make no more effort if they were not
prepared to support his formula.
It did indeed seem as if Malaysia
was unprepared to become involved in seeking a solution to the problems
of the Southern Philippines, although Prime Minister Razak told
Ambassador Lydman on Aug. 25 that both Malaysia and Indonesia were
prepared to offer assistance in the rehabilitation of Muslim areas
affected by the war — but only after the Philippine government had
ceased fighting and began to gain the confidence of Muslim leaders “for a
meaningful program of social and economic rehabilitation.” The rebels,
said Razak, were “desperate men who, knowing that they could not win
against the government forces, nevertheless were forced into violence
because of the hopelessness of their situation.”
Thus, the hopes of
those who had foreseen a swift conclusion to the problem of Sabah and
the amelioration of that in the Sulu archipelago were dashed. Slowly,
and not particularly successfully, attempts to find a solution would
continue.
source: Tribune by Ken Fuller
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